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Summary 
This thesis is a coilwtiolz of essay on decis~on making. Tlre first of these ezisays (Chapter 
2) deals with tlre traditiorlnl and contmwrsid topic of ordinal versus cerdind utility. By 
provid~ng simpbr m~cl more general preference bund~ltions for dilfcreircc r~prmetltatiolns, 
the chapter shows that cardioai utility is easier to oblnin Lhnn traclitior~elly tthor~ght. 
The cliaptsr tu~ifies ruU earlier del.ivationls by sibawing that they call be obtiairrd m direct 
corollaries. 
Chapter 3 i~lt~oduces a new preference canchkiom that cnlv Ire used to justiry (or crit- 
icize) expected utility. The approach of the cl~apter 1s alternative Ito Savage's, is 
accessrblc to reaclers witEiout a n~attlelnaiticd background. Jt is I~asecl orb H  net 11od for 
deriving L'toinparrsons of trdeolTs"' from ordiunl preferences. The muew coo~dition si~riph- 
fies previously-published trdcofr conditiaus. and at the satlw time provides Inore gel~eral 
and more pomrfinl tools to specialists. T h e  ca~~clitio~l is liore clascly rdutwl to enlpir- 
ical m e t l ~ d s  for measwing utilrty tl1a.n rts prevdecessors. 1C pruvicles s ul~ifyilrg tool for 
cluantitatively ruemwrin~g, clwalitativcl~~ testmg, R J I ~  ior111ativeby justifying expectocl utility. 
Chapter 4 extellcis the ~net l~ods from Chapter 3 to rank-deperrdent utilitji nnd prospect 
theory, and tlnereby gives axiomatic foz~rzclationu for those decisiurz ~nodals The resulting 
Soundatlons are, at, a time, more general and ramre acces.ss~ ble than earlier resultr. The con- 
ditlows wed are better sulted for cmplrjcd rneasurerrants of ut~Yilby tlrulr eat lier conilit,iu~~s, 
and accordingly are emier to test Wlaorens Glmptcr 3 is l'rartic,ulwrLy ndrlrcasrd to tetdcrei 
uithout B strong mstherrlaticel background, Cllnpter 4 call be seen as the tlzmrelical, more 
advrnced, and relore gerlera0, counterpart. 
Chaptea 5 and G deal wi th  loss axrersiorl 111 ~ r o s l x t  t~mry. To a ~011~idcral11e ~ X ~ P I J ~ ,  
risk aversion it is co~nmonly observed is caused by loss aversloll Cilapltcrb 5 psoposcs 
a cpantitatiue index of loss rlrvcrsronl. UncEer prospect thcwry, tlrc plopoval I c a d ~  LO a 
decomposition of risk attitude ~ n t o  three distiilct ron~ponents. intrinsbc utilily, psobalrility 
weighting, lass aversion. The mail1 t h m m  shows how the index of lass aversion ehf 
diflesent decision makers can be compared througkz observed choices. Chapter 6 pints  
out thc dificultiee, in quantifying loss avervion for genersll situations with nonmonetary 
outcoinr~ A hl~eorem, shrrws how, neu~thelffis,  also for general ~ . r u t ~ m e s  it is possible to 
obtain relative camparimm of lorn averaj~on. 
Chapters 7 and 8 apply rank-dependent utilutp and prospect theory to  bargaining ganc 
theory. Uncles rank-clependerrt utility hwa Factors influence the risk attitude of a decision 
maker. the utility Function and the probability weighting function. Arising from the same 
definition of risk avemion, two form3 of r i ~ k  aversion a n  be distinguished: utiE~ty risk 
aversioal ant1 psobal7iljstic risk aversio~a. The main finding of Chapters 7 is that these two 
f o r m  of rlsk aversion can have s~~rprisingly opposite consequencm for bargaining solutions 
ehat exhib~t a weak rnonotonicib property In partucular, in a large clms of bargaining 
problcrns lrothz ~ncsensed utility risk aversion and decreased prob~1Jnjlistic risk aversloru of the  
opponent are adv~~~tageous  for a player. Chap~cr 8 examines Chc influence of loss aversion 
in bargaining problems under prospect theory It is shown that IL is usually better for a 
plqer  if the opponerat 1s less loss awersc Thcsc results hold in particular for the KCaPal- 
Smorocllnsky and Ihc I<al;ai-Rownthd basgaining soltltions. The Nash bargaining solu.tlon 
cloes not Ikhave regularly in this respecl. 
Chapter 9 1s al~out nrr empirical experiment. The! dran~ge of currency in Europe galre 
iz. u~niquc opporlunity to test wl~ether pmple, when evaluat~ng maney, think in ternis of 
numbers instead of In terms of real values. It is hard to disentangle the inflr~ence of 
numbers and real vdnes on risk attitude. The currency converslo~~ gave the crpportunity 
to keep one of tlre two aypects fixed while the other vanes, and to observe changes in 
risk attitndc cnusecl by changing numbers separately from that caused Isy changing real 
values. I11 Delglum tJrc scnle changed by a, col?sider~tble, factor 40 Therefore, wc. chose 
Belgiuin to carry out an empirical study to test the ed~ects of .calue versus nurneriral 
C ~ I L I ~ ~ ~ : G Y .  WI: memul.od the risk a t t i t ~ r d e ~  of 87 si~l~je(.tii in December 21101, sklortly before 
the intt~oduchiorz of tlre Eum, nnci ciid the same For 92 subjects in May 21002, when people 
starlet( to gat accrrstornrecl ta the Eura. IYe ffi~rd that changes in ~mlaie while keepmg 
ru~trnborb constant da aKmt risk attitude, bul dznngeie% in nun~lsers while ke~ping valucq 
canstanl, do not, imu agrmnlcnt wit11 posttrletes of ratioriahity 


